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Abstract. The author considers the crisis in Ukraine from geopolitical 
angle while concentrating on the role of Belarus in it. He comes to 
conclusion that Belarus`s ability to benefit from the crisis nearby while 
simultaneously working to bring this crisis to an end deserves greater 
scrutiny and international recognition. 
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БЕЛАРУСЬ КАК «ТРЕТИЙ РАДУЮЩИЙСЯ» 
В ХОДЕ КРИЗИСА В УКРАИНЕ 
 
Аннотация. В статье рассматривается кризис в Украине в контексте 
его геополитической перспективы, при этом особое внимание 
уделяется роли Беларуси. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что 
способность Беларуси получать определенные выгоды от кризиса в 
соседнем государстве и одновременно способствовать его 
урегулированию заслуживает более пристального внимания, а также 
международного признания. 
 




The crisis in Ukraine has elicited many emotions, while also revealing 
a lack of strategic thinking on both sides of the growing divide. There are 
at least four angles from which to examine the conflict. The first such 
angle is international law, and from this perspective Russia has clearly 
violated its basic norms. The second angle is nation-building. Two out of 
three East Slavic communities, Ukraine and Belarus, betray a lack of a 
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unified identity and/or a lack of national consolidation. Significant 
segments of both populations are closely connected to Russians. 
Consequently, almost any attempt to create a cohesive and inclusive 
national home in Ukraine and Belarus requires distancing from Russia, 
which may assume ugly forms, as exemplified by the tragic events in 
Odessa on May 2, 2014. A third perspective is to think of the conflict as a 
side effect of the lingering breakup of the Soviet Union, something that was 
deceptively sold to the general public as a one-act drama played out in 
December 1991, but which is actually a lengthy and painful process. 
The fourth angle or perspective is geopolitical. It has become habitual 
to hear criticism of Russia for its unjustifiable attachment to an archaic 
nineteenth-century concept of spheres of influence, whereas in today’s 
world, a knowledge-based economy, not control over additional space, is 
what is really important. Barack Obama spelled this out while delivering 
his criticism of Vladimir Putin. As a PR gesture, this criticism is perfectly 
acceptable, and Russian liberals routinely embrace this sort of thinking. At 
the same time, the survival of NATO despite the end of the Cold War, and 
its steady eastward expansion thereafter, reflect an attachment to the very 
same concept of spheres of influence of which Russia unilaterally stands 
accused. By that logic, Russia may be criticized for biting off more than it 
can chew by entering a confrontation it can ill-afford, but not for 
embracing anachronistic ideas of which its geopolitical rival has long 
disposed. Moreover, since the early 1990s, American policy on Ukraine has 
been more visibly impacted by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s famous dictum that 
without Ukraine, Russia is no longer an empire, than by anything else. 
Geopolitics under the guise of democracy promotion does not stop being 
geopolitics.1  
Situated in the same geopolitical niche between Russia and the West-
European alliances, the Republic of Belarus has been persistently targeted 
in the same manner as Ukraine, but it proved less susceptible to the 
American policy of the Western world’s expansion at the expense of what is 
now being called as the “Russian world” for three major reasons. First, its 
cultural divide, while showing some marks of existence, is much less vivid 
and pronounced than in Ukraine. Second, it developed a consolidated 
political elite. Third, it nipped oligarchic capitalism in the bud, in part 
because Belarus is resource-poor and in part because of an unusually 
strong grassroots attachment to equality, historically upheld by a 
redistributive peasant commune. In that sense, Belarus is more culturally 
Russian than Russia itself, definitely more so than today’s oligarchic 
Russia. Without oligarchs, Belarus is not prone to develop multiple centers 
of power. 
Having successfully resisted the geopolitical advances of the Western 
world, Belarus was labeled a pariah state and Europe’s last dictatorship. 
                                                 
1 I expressed this idea in my 2013 article “Geostrategic Interest and Democracy Promotion”, 
and three years earlier in my presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington 
(http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/grigory-ioffe). 
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However, because Belarus emerged unscathed from the same advances 
that may have led to the tragic conflict in Ukraine, it was also able to 
extract benefits from that conflict. First, it performed a balancing act on 
Ukraine,  retaining close ties with Russia while backing Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity. This made it possible for Minsk to offer the venue for 
crucial peace talks, raising Belarus’s heretofore meager international 
profile. Initially Baroness Ashton, the former chief of EU diplomacy who 
imposed travel sanctions on Alexander Lukashenka, paid a visit to the 
Belarusian president and praised him for his efforts at brokering peace. 
Then the leaders of Germany and France traveled to Minsk for truce 
negotiations and honored Lukshenka with small talk. Few people realize 
the piquancy of the event. Previously, the top officials of each of these 
countries had stopped in Belarus just once. On August 3, 1941, Adolf 
Hitler visited the town of Borisov, the headquarters of the army group 
Zentrum, which was taking part in the massive German invasion of the 
Soviet Union. On January 11, 1973, French President Georges Pompidou 
arrived in Minsk for talks with Leonid Brezhnev. Incidentally, testifying to 
the woefully low level of Belarus’s name recognition in the West, a 
photograph of the Franco-Soviet meeting, found in the online archive of the 
reputable Corbis Images collection, bears the caption: “Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev shakes hands with French President Georges Pompidou 
at Minsk airport in Ukraine on his arrival.”2  
Second, the crisis in Ukraine converted the notion of Belarus’s 
stability from a propaganda cliché used by official Minsk into a palpable 
reality. The respective change in perception is all the more acute as 
Ukraine is a culturally close neighboring country situated in the same 
geopolitical space (between Russia and the West) as Belarus, and yet 
Ukraine’s economic system and quality of its leaders pale beside those of 
Belarus in the eyes of most Belarusians. Lukashenka’s pacifying mission 
and his balancing act are to the liking of most Belarusians, as polling firms 
funded by the West have discovered. They have also found that at least 
half of Belarusians trust their leader and at least 40 percent of them would 
be willing to vote for him as president should elections be conducted today. 
To be sure, there are many who argue that in a dictatorship, public 
opinion polls should be treated with caution, a statement that cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. However, even Lukashenka’s harshest critics, such 
as Valer Karbalevich, the author of a disparaging biography, affirm that his 
popular support is not entirely fictitious. Moreover, whereas previously the 
president’s popularity closely tracked with Belarusians’ personal incomes, 
a correlation repeatedly uncovered by earlier research, now incomes are 
falling and Lukashenka’s rating is, at a minimum, not following suit. 
                                                 
2 Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and French President Georges Pompidou in Ukraine. 
Photographer Henri Bureau. Accessed March 15, 2015.  
http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/42-17090300/soviet-leader-
leonid-brezhnev-and-french-president. 
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Third, concerned about the potential loss of Belarusian statehood, 
Western governments have put their universalizing human rights 
concerns, which Stephen White of the University of Glasgow has labeled 
“values imperialism,” on the back burner and intensified contacts with 
Minsk (White, Fekliunina 2014). Beginning in fall 2014, numerous high-
level European bureaucrats paid a visit to Minsk. For example, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, the country chairing the Council of the 
European Union until June 2015 and the country that will host the 
European Union’s Eastern Partnership summit in Riga next month, made 
it to Minsk. It is likely, though not certain, that Lukashenka himself will 
chair the Belarus delegation at that summit. Cardinal Pietro Parolin, 
Vatican’s Secretary of State, also visited Belarus during this period. 
Further, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Rubin paid a visit. 
Although Rubin is not a high-level official, Lukashnka received him. In its 
legislative efforts through the Belarus Democracy Acts, the United States 
had attempted a diplomatic isolation of Belarus, but this effort is now 
being reversed.  
Fourth, Belarusians have begun to place greater value in their 
statehood and national identity. In December 2014, only 24 percent of 
Belarusians polled by a Western firm stated they would vote for unification 
with Russia if a respective referendum were conducted at that moment, 
whereas 58 percent would vote against. Several years prior, more people 
had opted for unification than for independence. Look at December 2007. 
A growing consensus about the value of independence has consolidated 
Belarusian society. Describing her impressions about Lukashenka’s 
January 15 press conference, an opposition-minded journalist had this to 
say: “We are different, very much so. We have different opinions and views 
on how Belarus should develop. But we live in this country. This is what 
unites us. And we have to keep that in mind, especially today. We should 
stay together despite differences. This feeling was in the air, I did not 
notice anything like this before” (Zolotova 2015). Such deeply felt words 
reflect a willingness for national consolidation, something that Belarus has 
been lacking previously. 
Fifth, Belarus is now able to boost its already sizeable (close to $3 
billion) agricultural exports to Russia thanks to a retaliatory embargo on 
foods from several Western countries by Russia. This is despite a recent, 
acrimonious trade war with Russia that banned imports from twenty-three 
Belarusian meet processing plants and accused Belarus of reexporting 
Western foods. These allegations have since been resolved. Likewise, 
Belarus is going to make up, in part, for the now lost Ukrainian 
collaborators of Russia’s military industrial complex.  
Sixth, Belarus was able to overcome the obstacles to ratification of the 
Eurasian Union (with Russia and Kazakhstan) in exchange for benefits. 
Specifically, Russia agreed to annul the transfers of export duties for 
refined oil products sold by Belarus to the West back to Russia’s budget, a 
$3.5 billion saving for Belarus. This is because the conflict in Ukraine 
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made Russia’s concessions to Belarus more necessary, as the value of each 
remaining integration partner has grown in the absence of Ukraine. Russia 
even halted its pressure on Belarus to agree to major joint venture 
schemes that would effectively transfer some major Belarusian industrial 
plants into Russian oligarchs’ hands. Belarus has been doggedly opposed 
to these schemes despite its financial dependency on Russia because of 
cheap oil and shrinking demand for Belarusian industrial products. 
Western donors may decide to resume their credit lines to Belarus. A 
recent IMF mission to Minsk and a visit by the director of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been positive, if belated 
signs that Western funding may be resumed in the near future.   
In addition, Belarus made a serious effort to curb further decline in its 
trade exchange with Ukraine. Thus, in January 2015, the two countries 
agreed that Ukraine would now pay for Belarusian non-petroleum exports 
in hryvnas. This was a risky decision on Minsk’s part given the instability 
of the hryvna. However, in so doing, Belarus was able to retain much of 
the market share for its products in Ukraine, Belarus’s second-largest 
trading partner, with which it enjoys a trade surplus. Until recently, 
Ukraine had sold electricity to Belarus, but their roles have reversed, with 
Ukraine set to purchase electricity from its northern neighbor. Moreover, 
as some Ukrainian thermal stations switch from coal to fuel oil, the latter 
will be imported from Belarus. Due to deficiencies in Ukraine’s oil refining 
capacity, part of the oil extracted in Ukraine may soon be processed at the 
Mozyr refinery in Belarus. Should the Ukrainian initiative of inviting 
international peacekeeping detachments find international support, the 
Belarusian military may become a key part of those peacekeeping units. 
Despite close ties with Russia, Belarus is still committed to the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine. This, among other things, have given some analysts 
reason to claim that by being an ally of Moscow, Minsk is more 
independent from Russia than the Baltic and Balkan members of the 
European Union are from Brussels (for more details see Ioffe 2015). 
Could it then be that that Alexander Lukashenka, labelled the last 
dictator of Europe, has been doing something right?3 It is indeed likely that 
this national leader is routinely underrated. “Disturbing though it may 
sound,” one democracy promoter quipped back in 2009, “Lukashenka has 
proved to have greater national responsibility and integrity than the entire 
Orange elite in Ukraine” (Jarábik 2009). The five-word qualifier that begins 
this statement of praise only makes the statement more compelling. While 
not a Western-style democrat by any means, nor claiming to be or to ever 
become one, Lukashenka is at a minimum more astute than the public 
and scholarly dialogue about him have suggested. Likewise, the world itself 
is more nuanced and multifaceted than the “end of history” argument 
                                                 
3 My view on this subject has been reinforced not only by my area studies work, but also by 
my several interviews with the Belarusian leader. I have published my conclusions in my 
relatively recent book, “Reassessing Lukashenka: Belarus in cultural and geopolitical context” 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
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implies. An unexpected purveyor of stability in Europe, the Republic of 
Belarus is a seemingly successful case of defying popular stereotypes. Its 
ability to benefit from the crisis nearby while simultaneously working to 
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